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DOES MONETARY POLICY  MATTER?  NARRATIVE  VERSUS  STRUCTURAL APPROACHES 
ABSTRACT 
This  paper  compares  results from  the narrative approach of Romer  and Romer 
(1989)  to  those from  the structural approach regarding the effects of monetary 
policy on  real  output.  The  results from both approaches  lead to the 
conclusions that monetary policy matters and that the effects build slowly 
following  a monetary  policy  shock.  The narrative  approach,  however,  leads  to 
larger and more persistent  effects  than  does the structural  approach.  Reasons 
are advanced  in the paper  as to why this might  be so. 
Ray C. Fair 
Cowles  Foundation 
Box 2125,  Yale Station 
New Haven,  CT 06520 I.  Introduction 
Romer and Romer  (1989)  use what they  call the "narrative  approach"  to 
examine the effects of monetary  policy  on real output.  This approach is in 
the spirit  of the work of Friedman  and Schwartz  (1963).  In defending  this 
approach,  Romer  and Romer (RR) point  out that statistical  teats  like 
"regressions  of output  on money, studies of the effects  of 'anticipated'  and 
'unanticipated'  money,  and vector  autoregressions 
.  . .  cannot  persuasively 
identify  the direction  of  causation."  (p. 1)  This criticism,  however, does 
not apply to the estimation  of structural  relationships,  and the structural 
approach is a clear  alternative  to the narrative  approach.  The purpose of 
this paper is to see if the two approaches  lead to similar  results  regarding 
monetary policy  effects. 
RR chose six  months in the post-war  period  in  which they  believed there 
was a negative  monetary shock  that  was independent  of the level  of output: 
October  1947,  September  1955, December 1968, April  1974,  August 1978,  and 
October  1979.  They defined  a dummy  variable,  D, that is one in each  of 
these months and zero otherwise.  They  next regressed  the percentage  change 
in industrial  production  on a constant,  11 seasonal  dummy variables,  24 lags 
of the percentage  change  in industrial  production,  the current  value of  0, 
and 36 lags  of 0.  The estimation  period  was January 1948 -  December  1987. 
From this  regression  they  computed  the impulse  response  function  of a one 
unit increase  in  D. 2 
The impulse  response  function  showed  little  effect  on industrial 
produotion  for about  the first eight  montha  after the shock, but negative 
and fairly  large  effects  after that.  The maximum impact  was industrial 
production  12 percent  lower  after  33 months.  Similar  results  were obtained 
using the level  of the unemployment  rate in plate of the percentage  change 
in industrial  production.  The maximum  impact  waa the unemployment  rate 2.1 
percentage  points  higher  after  34  months.  In both cases  the affects of the 
shocks  showed  considerable  persistence.  P.R concluded  from the overall 
results that  monetary shocks have real effects, 
In moat structural  macroeconometric  models interest  rates  affect  a 
number  of categories  of investment  and at least  a few categories  of 
consumer  expenditures.  In this framework  a test of whether  monetary  policy 
matters is simply  a teat  of the significance  of the interest  rate 
coefficients  in the estimated  investment  and consumption  equations.  In most 
models interest  rates  are significant  in  a number of  equations,  and so the 
RR conclusion  chat  monetary shocks have real effects  is hardly surprising  to 
a structural  model  builder. 
The structural  approach  is based  on the estimation  of approximations  to 
decision  equations.1'  It is open to the criticism  that the estimated 
approximations  may be seriously  miaspecified.  Aggregation  problems  may be 
serious,  inaccurate  functional  forms may be used,  and the fact that "deep 
structural  paremetera"  are not being  estimated  may be quantitatively 
important.  On the other  hand,  the P.R regreaaiona  seem  even more open to the 
possibility  of being seriously  miaspecified.  The regressions  are  reduced- 
form like  equations,  and it  seems  likely  that the regressions  have left  out 
1  .  See Fair  (1989) for discusaion  of this. 3 
many  variables  that belong  in the true  reduced  form equations  for industrial 
production  and unemployment.  Certainly  the implicit  reduced  form equations 
for output  and unemployment  in a typical macroeconometric  model contain  many 
more variables  than  are in the RR regressions. 
RR examine  the robustness  of their  results  by adding  supply-shock, 
fiscal-policy,  and inflation  variables  to  their  regressions  and by excluding 
certain  shocks  from  the regressions.  They  report  that adding  other 
variables  lowers  the maximum  impact on industrial  production  and 
unemployment  slightly,  but no numbers  are given.  When the monetary shocks 
in 1974 and 1979 are excluded (since they  may be associated  with oil price 
shocks)  P.R report  that the maximum impact  on industrial  production  falls 
from  12 percent  to 10  percent.  Although these robustness  tests are of some 
interest,  they fall  far short  of adding  enough  variables  to the reduced 
form  equations  to satisfy  a structural  model  builder. 
Another  problem  with the P.R approach  is that the use of the same value 
of D (namely  one) for each of the six shocks  is a strong  assumption.  It 
seems unlikely that the Fed tightened  up by the same amount  in each case, 
As will be seen in  the next section,  the degree of tightening  appears  to 
have varied considerably  across  the shocks. 
Given that  both approaches  are open to  criticism,  it is of interest  to 
see if they lead  to similar  results,  namely  if the P.R results  are consistent 
with the properties  of a structural  macroeconometric  model.  If  the results 
are consistent,  this is to some extent  support  for both approaches.  A 
structural  model  builder could  say that  although  the  P.R  regressions  leave 
out many important  variables,  this  misspecification  does  not appear  to 
affect  in a serious way the estimated  effects  of monetary  policy  on real 4 
output.  PR could say that  although  structural  models  are subject  to many 
problems,  their  properties  regarding  the effects  of monetary  policy on real 
output  seem about  right.  If  the results  are not conaistent,  the differences 
may shed light on possible  biases  of each approach. 
II.  Estimated  Effects  of the Shocks from a Structural  Mcdel 
It is fairly  easy to see if the properties  of a structural  model are 
consistent  with the P.R results.  The Fair  model (1984)  is used as the 
structural  model in  this paper.2  The model is quarterly,  and the data set 
begins in 1952 I,  The October  1907 shock  could  not be analyzed  because  the 
data  set does not gc back that far. 
In the regular  version of the model  monetary  policy is endogenous. 
One of the stochastic  equations  is an interest  rate  reaction  function, 
where the Fed is estimated  to "lead  against  the wind" as real  output 
increases,  labor  markets  tighten,  inflation  increases,  and the lagged  growth 
of the money supply  increases.  The interest  rate  on the left-hand-side  of 
this equation  is the three-month  Treasury  bill rare,  denoted  RS, which is 
the key short  term rare in  the model.  For the present  results  this equation 
was dropped,  and RS was  taken  to be exogenous. 
The results of the experiments  are presented  in Table 1,  and the rest 
of this section is a discussion  of this table.  Consider  Experiment  I first. 
2The model consists  of 30 stochastic  equations  and 98 identities.  The 
main description  of it is in Chapters  3 and 4 in Fair (1984)  .  The  results 
of adding  age distribution  variables  to the household  behavioral  equations 
are presented  in Fair  and Oomingues  (1989), and the equations  with the age 
variables included  are uaed for the current  results.  It can be seen in 
Tables  1 and 2 in this latter  paper that the interest  rate  is highly 
significant  in the equations  explaining  ronaumption  of  services,  durable 
expenditures,  and housing  investment.  For the present  results  the model  was 
estimated  by two-stage  least  squares  for the 1954 I 
-  1988  IV  period. 5 
TABLE 1 
Estimated  Effects of Monetary  Shocks  from a Structural  Model 
EXPERIMENT  1:  1955 IV -  1960  III 
Actual 





%Y  %IP  tUR 
1955 I  1.26  -  -  - 
II  1.61  -  -  - 
III  1.86  -  -  - 
IV  2.35  1.86  .06  .11  -.02 
1956 I  2.38  1.86  .21  .38  - .09 
II  2.60  1.86  .41  .74  -.19 
III  2.60  1.86  .65  1.17  -.31 
IV  3.06  1.86  .93  1.67  -.45 
1957  I  3,17  1.86  1.27  2.29  - .62 
II  3.16  1.86  1.62  2.91  -.80 
III  3.38  1.86  1.94  3.49  - .98 
IV  3.34  1.86  2.28  4.13  -1.14 
1958 I  1.84  1.84  2.39  4.34  -1.20 
II  1.02  1.02  2.11  3.84  -1.09 
III  1.71  1.71  1.69  3.05  - .91 
IV  2.79  2.79  1.20  2.16  -.68 
1959 I  2.80  2.80  .72  1.27  - .45 
II  3.02  3.02  .25  .42  - .22 
III  3.53  3.53  - .18  - .34  .01 
IV  4.30  4.30  - .55  -1.01  .20 
1960 I  3.94  3.94  - .84  -1.54  .37 
II  3.09  3.09  -1.09  -1.97  .49 
III  2.39  2.39  -1.25  -2.28  .59 TABLE  1  (continued) 







of  %IXY  %txIP  UR 
1968 Ii  5.51  -  -  - 
III  5.23  -  -  - 
IV  5.58  -  -  -  - 
1969 I  6.14  5.58  .05  .09  - .02 
II  6.24  5.58  .17  .30  - .07 
III  7.05  5.58  .37  66  - .16 
IV  7.32  5.58  .69  1.23  - .31 
1970 I  7.26  5.58  1.03  1.84  -.48 
II  6.75  5.58  1.29  2.32  - .62 
III  6.38  5.58  1.42  2.55  -  70 
IV  5.36  5.36  1.41  2.54  -.71 
1971 I  3.86  3.86  1.21  2.17  - .63 
II  421  4.21  .98  1.76  - .53 
III  5.05  5.05  .71  1.27  -.39 
IV  423  4.23  .43  .77  - .26 
1972 1  3.44  3.44  .15  .26  -.12 
II  3.75  3.75  - .10  - .19  .00 
III  4.24  4.24  - .32  - .58  .11 
IV  4.85  4.85  - .49  - .88  .20 
1973 I  5.64  5.64  - .62  -1.10  .27 













EXPERIMENT  3:  1974 II -  1979  I 
No-shock 






III  8.39 
IV  7.46 
1974  I  7.60 
II  8.27 
III  8.29 
IV  7.34 
1975 1  5.87 
II  5.40 
III  6.34 
IV  5.68 
1976  I  4.95 
II  5.17 
III  5.17 
IV  4.70 
1977  I  4.62 
II  4.83 
III  5.47 
IV  6.14 
1978 I  6.41  II  6.48 
III  7.32 
IV  8.68 
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.05 TA8LE 1  (continued) 
EXPERIMENT  4: 1978 III 
-  1983  II 
Actual  No-shock 
value of  value  of  %Y  %IP  TJR 
RS  RS 
1977  IV  6.14  - 
1978 I  6.41  - 
II  6.48  - 
III  7.32  6.48 
IV  8.68  6.48 
1979 I  9.36  6.48 
II  9.37  6.48 
III  9.63  6.48 
IV  11.80  11.80 
1980 I  13.46  13.46 
II  10.05  10.05 
III  9.24  9.24 
IV  13.71  13.71 
1981  1  14.37  14.37 
II  14.83  14.83 
III  15.09  15.09 
IV  12.02  12.02 
1982 1  12.90  12.90 
II  12.36  12.36 
Ill  9.71  9.71 
IV  7.94  7.94 
1983 I  8.08 
II  8.42 
8.08 
8.42 
.07  .12  -.02 
.31  .53  - .10 
.69  1.20  - .26 
1.12  1.97  - .46 
1.49  2.62  - .70 
1.60  2.81  -.90 
1,49  2.60  - .92 
1.33  2.33  -.82 
1.06  1.85  - .67 
.74  1.28  -.50 
.40  .70  - .33 
.09  .15  - .17 
- .19  - .35  - .02 
- .45  -.80  .12 
- .68  -1.20  .23 
- .85  -1.50  .32 
- .99  -1.74  .38 







EXPERIMENT  1978 III  -  1983  II 
%Y  %AIP  1JR 
Actual 
value  of 
___________ RS 
1977 IV  6.14 
1978 I  6.41 
II  6.48 
III  7.32 
IV  8.68 
1979 I  9.36 
II  9.37 
III  9.63 
IV  11.80 
1980 I  13.46 
II  10.05 
III  9.24 
IV  13.71 
1981  I  14.37 
II  14.83 
III  15.09 
IV  12.02 
1982  I  12.90 
II  12.36 
III  9.71 
IV  7.94 
1983 I  8.08 


















































































-1  . 24 TABLE 1 (continued) 
EXPERIMENT  6:  1979 IV -  1984  III 
Actual  No-shock 
value of  value of  %txY  %txIP  BIJR 
RS  RS 
1979 1  9.36  -  -  - 
II  9.37  -  -  - 
III  9,63  -  -  -  - 
IV  11.80  9.63  .18  .32  - .05 
1980  I  13.46  9.63  63  1.10  - .22 
II  10.05  9.63  .92  1.61  - .38 
III  9.24  9.63  .94  1.65  - .43 
IV  13,71  9.63  1.21  2.12  - .51 
1981 1  14.37  9.63  1.70  2.97 
- .70 
II  14.63  9.63  2.30  4.01  - .94 
III  15.09  9.63  2.90  5.06  -1.22 
IV  12.02  9.63  3.25  5.69  -1.40 
1982 I  12.90  9.63  3.43  6.00  -1.49 
II  12.36  9.63  3.40  5.95  -1.48 
III  9.71  9.63  3.03  5.31  -1.35 
IV  7.94  7.94  2.38  4.17  -1.09 
1983 I  8.08  8.08  1.62  2.81  - .77 
II  8.42  8.42  .81  1.39  - .43 
III  9.19  9.19  .06  .07  - .10 
IV  8.79  8.79  - .62  -1.10  .20 
1984 I  9.13  9.13  -1.18  -2.07  .47 
II  9.84  9.84  -1.64  -2.86  .69 
III  10,34  10.34  -2.00  -3.46  .87 
Notes: 
RS  Thtee-month  Treasury  bill rate. 
Percentage  deviation  of teal 0NP from its base value in 
percentage  points. 
%BIP  —  Percentage  deviation  of industrial  production  from its 
base value in percentage  points. 
AUR  —  Change  in the unemployment  tate from its base value in 
percentage  points. 9 
September  1955 is one of the RR shock  months.  It can be seen  from the table 
that  RS rose from 1.86 in 1955 III to 2.35 in 1955 IV.  It rose further 
after  that and continued  to be above  1.86  until 1958 1.  In order to run the 
experiment,  one has to choose  what the Fed would  have done  had there  been no 
shock.  As can be seen  in the table,  the assumption  here is that  the Fed 
would have kept the interest  rate at 1.86 through  1957 IV.  In other  words, 
the Fed would not have allowed interest  rates  to rise in 1956  and 1957. 
After 1957 IV,  the assumption  is that the shock  was over,  and the values of 
RS are simply  set to their  actual  values. 
The question  to ask of the model is how would  the economy  have differed 
had there  been no monetary  shock?  For Experiment  1, the five-year  period 
1955 IV -  1960  III was considered.  The estimated  error  terms  were first 
added to the stochastic  equations  of the model and taken  to be exogenous. 
This means  that when the model is solved  using  the actual  values  of all the 
exogenous  variables,  a perfect tracking  solution is obtained.  The solution 
values  of the endogenous  variables  are simply  the actual  values.  The model 
was then solve  for the new  (non-shock) values of  RS.  The difference  between 
the solution  value  of an endogenous  variable  and its actual  value for a 
given  quarter  is an estimate  of the effect  of the shock on the variable, 
The results  for three  endogenoua  variables  are reported  in Table I:  real  GNP 
(Y) ,  industrial  production  (IP), and the unemployment  rate  (UR) 
3lndustrial  production  is not a variable  in the regular  version of the 
model.  For purposes  of this paper it is useful  to be able to predict 
industrial  production  because  this  is the output  measure  used by P.R. 
Therefore,  a simple link  from real output  (Y) to industrial  production  (IP) 
was estimated.  The equation  is: 
log IP  -12.6  + 1.541og  Y 
,  p  .993  ,  SE  .0132,  P.2  .999, 
(13.32)  (15.49)  (111.49) 
where p is the estimated  first  order  serial  correlation  coefficient  of the 
error term and the numbers in parentheses  are t-  statistics  in absolute 10 
The results  for Experiment  1 show that  the peak  effect  on all three 
variables  is 10 quarters  after the change.  This is close  to the PR number 
of 33 or 34 months.  In  addition,  the effects  for the first two or three 
quarters  are fairly  small, which is consistent  with the PR results.  tn the 
other  hand,  the sizes  of the peak  effects  are much smaller here.  For 
industrial  production  the peak effect  is 4.34  percent,  which compares  to the 
PR number  of 10 to 12 percent.  For the unemployment  rate the peak effect  is 
1.20  percentage  points,  which  compares  to about 2 percentage  points  for RR, 
Also,  the effects  here are less  persistent  than those reported  by  PR.  In 
fact,  after about  four  years the signs  of the changes are reversed.  The 
shock  has generated  a small  cycle. 
The same procedure  was followed  for the other  experiments.  For 
Experiment  2 the solution  period  was 1969 I  -  1973  IV.  In this case the 
results in  Table 1 show that  the peaks  are reached  after  7 or S quarters. 
The sizes  of the changes  for Experiment  2 are slightly  smaller  than those 
for Experiment  1. 
Experiment  3 covers the 1974 II  -  1979  I period.  Although  PR chose 
April 1974  as a shock  month,  the overall  shock  in this case  was much smaller 
than the others  as measured  by the size and duration  of the increase  in PS 
from the base quarter.  Only in 1974  II and III was PS higher than  the base- 
quarter  value of 7.60.  The results  for Experiment  3 show that this shock 
had fairly  small  effetts  as estimated  by the model. 
The two remaining  PR shock months  are August  1978 and  October  1979.  It 
is somewhat  unclear  whether  the August  1978 shock should  be assumed  to end 
in October 1979 or continue  after  that.  For Experiment  4 the shock  was 
value.  The equation  was estimated  by ordinary  least  squares  for the 1954 I 
-  1988  IV  period. 11 
assumed to end in October  1979,  and for Experiment  5 it was assumed to 
continue to the end of the solution  period.  For Experiment  4 the peak 
impact  occurs  after  6 quarters,  with the effect  on industrial  production 
being 2.81  percent, and for Experiment  5 the peak impact occurs  after  15 
quarters,  with the effect  on industrial  production  being 999  percent.  The 
peak effects  on the unemployment  rate are .92 and 2.65 percentage  points 
respectively.  Note that for Experiment  5 the shock  is quite  large:  RS is 
held to 6.48  percent  through  the period in  which the actual  values  reached 
double  digits. 
Experiment  6 is for the shock that began in October  1979.  The effects 
here are also fairly  large.  The peak effects  are after  10 quarters,  with 
the effect  on industrial  production  of 6.00  percent  and the effect  on the 
unemployment  rate of 1.49  percentage  points. 
It should  be noted that  the present  results would not be changed  very 
much if  the beginning  quarter  for each shock was taken to be one quarter 
sooner  than  what  was in fact done.  In each case,  as can be seen in  Table  1, 
the interest  rate in the quarter  sooner is close  to the interest  rate  in  the 
quarter actually  used,  For Experiment  1,  for eiample,  the interest  rate in 
the quarter sooner  is 1.61,  which is only  slightly  smaller  than the value  of 
1.86 used.  The results in  Table  1 are thus not sensitive  to timing  issues 
of this kind. 
What do the overall  results in  Table  1 say about  the RR results?  There 
are four  main messages  First (a  point that is not model specific),  the 
size and duration  of the shocks  as measured  by the interest  rate deviations 
vary considerably  across  the five shock  periods.  It is thus  not clear  that 
RR's use of one for all six nonzero  values  of 0 is accurate,  Second,  the RR 
result  that the initial  effects  are small  and the peak  effect  occurs  after 12 
33 to 34 months is consistent  with some loose  average  of the results  in 
Table 1.  Third,  the persistence  of the P.R effects  is inconsistent  with the 
results  in Table 1, which in fact  show  small  cycles  being generated. 
Fourth,  the  P.R maximum  effects  of 10 to 12 percent  for industrial  production 
and 2.1 percentage  points  for the unemployment  rate are on average  higher 
than the maximum effects in  Table  1.  Only for Experiment  5 are the peak 
effects  similar. 
III.  Conclusion 
in structural  macroeconometric  models  monetary  policy  matters  because 
interest  rates are significsnt  explanatory  variables  in investment  and 
consumption  equations.  The  P.R conclusion  that  monetary  policy  matters  is 
clearly  consistent  with this.  Likewise,  the timing  of the effects from the 
initial  shock  to the peak impact  is similar  between the two approaches, 
which is encoursging  to  both.  The main inconsistencies  are the larger 
estimated  effects  for  P.R and their persistence. 
The persistence  differences  may stem  from so many  variables  being 
excluded  from  the  P.R regressions.  These regressions  are likely  to be much 
more autoregressive  than  the implied  reduced form  equations  of structural 
models.  There are,  for example,  a number of channels  through which cycles 
can be generated  in structural  models following  an interest  rate  shock.  As 
the economy  expands,  prices  may initially  rise faster  than  nominal  wages, 
which eventually  has a negative  effect  on  demand.  Also,  stocks  of durable 
goods, housing, and capital  are built  up during  an expansion,  and these 
eventually  have a negative  effect  on further  increases  in  durable 
expenditures,  housing  investment,  and plant  and equipment  investment.  The 
increase  in prices  also  has negative  real wealth  effects.  In the present 13 
model the eventual  negative  effect  from  the build  up of the stocks  of 
durable  goods,  housing,  and capital  is the main  cause  of the cycles in  Table 
Since the P.R regressions  do not incorporate  stock  effects  of this kind, 
it is not surprising  that they  show  more persistence  than does the 
structural  model. 
it is less clear why monetary  policy  effects  are larger  for  P.R  than 
they are for the structural  model.  It may be that interest  rate effects  are 
underestimated  in  the structural  model through misspecification  of the 
structural  equations.  Or it may be that by treating  all shocks  as the same, 
the RR regressions  give  undue  weight  to the large shocks  in 1978 and 1979 
and thus  bias upward  the estimated  size of  the monetary  policy  effects. 
More sensitivity  tests  are needed  before  much can be said about  thia 
4Although  not shown  in Table 1, the cycles  damp  down over time,  After 
a few more quarters,  the negative  chsnges  begin  to reverse  themselves.  No 
coefficient  restrictions  have been imposed  in  the estimation  of the model 
regarding  either  short  run or long  run effects. 14 
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